Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective

  • Jacques Pelkmans


Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across borders. In the EU’s internal goods market it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the remaining obstacles; namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. Mutual recognition (MR) is widely appreciated for the original and simple fashion in which it can solve what seemed long an intractable and infinite steeplechases of overcoming obstacles for thousands of products. It also underlies ingenious ways to facilitate the free movement of services. This general appreciation has spread beyond the Union to other continents and the WTO. The notion of MR has travelled beyond disciplines, too, from European law and the domain of regulatory specialists to economists worldwide.


Member State Foreign Direct Investment Internal Market Free Movement Market Failure 
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© Jacques Pelkmans 2005

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  • Jacques Pelkmans

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