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Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance

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Corporate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity

Part of the book series: The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Series ((JLEI))

Abstract

Over the past two decades the ideology of shareholder value has become entrenched as a principle of corporate governance among companies based in the United States and Britain. Over the past two or three years, the rhetoric of shareholder value has become prominent in the corporate governance debates in European nations such as Germany, France and Sweden. Within the past year, the arguments for ‘maximizing shareholder value’ have even achieved prominence in Japan. In 1999 the OECD issued a document, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, that emphasizes that corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interests of shareholders (OECD, 1999)

A version of this paper has been published in Economy and Society, 29, 1, 2000

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© 2002 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Lazonick, W., O’Sullivan, M. (2002). Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance. In: Lazonick, W., O’Sullivan, M. (eds) Corporate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523739_2

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