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Abstract

Over the past quarter century advocates of the conventional capitalist paradigm have engineered a resurgence of laissez-faire style public policies, particularly in the United States. Challengers to this ‘religion’ have been beaten back or otherwise marginalized by advocates of so-called free-market economic policies as they clamour for a form of societal auto-regulation through market-based institutions.

Keywords

Common Good Social Welfare Function Wealth Creation Household Saving Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
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Notes

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    Also required are public initiatives to curtail self-interested acts by individuals, with large negative external effects. For instance, economist Michelle J. White contends that drivers have been running an ‘arms race’ on American roads by buying increasingly large vehicles, particularly sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks. An important reason for driving them is that they provide their families extra protection in the event of a crash. But these vehicles pose an increased danger to occupants of smaller vehicles as well as to pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists. ‘For each one million drivers that shift from driving cars to driving light trucks (SUVs included), between 34 and 93 additional car occupants, pedestrians, bicyclists or motorcyclists are killed per year and the value of the lives lost is between $234 and $624 million per year.’ See M.J. White, ‘The “Arms Race” on American Roads: the Effect of SUVs and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety’, Working Paper 9302 (San Diego: Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego and Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© James E. Sawyer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • James E. Sawyer

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