Almost all decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. Each individual is represented as making decisions in the light of his or her own preferences and beliefs. A person may have preferences about consequences of her actions which affect other people; but these are still her preferences. She may have beliefs about what other people will choose; but these are still her beliefs. In making decisions, she acts alone.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bacharach, Michael (1993) ‘Variable universe games’ in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman and P. Tani (eds), Frontiers of Game Theory (pp. 255–275) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).Google Scholar
- Bacharach, Michael (1999) ‘Interactive team reasoning: a contribution to the theory of cooperation’, Research in Economics (53), 117–147.Google Scholar
- Binmore, Ken (1994) Playing Fair (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).Google Scholar
- Gilbert, Margaret (1989) On Social Facts (London: Routledge).Google Scholar
- Hodgson, D. H. (1967) Consequences of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Google Scholar
- Hurley, Susan L. (1989) Natural Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
- Lewis, David (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1762/1988) ‘On social contract’ in Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella (eds) Rousseau’s Political Writings (New York: Norton).Google Scholar
- Schelling, Thomas (1960) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
- Searle, John R. (1990) ‘Collective intentions and actions’, in Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan and Martha E. Pollack (eds) Intentions in Communication (pp. 410–415) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).Google Scholar
- Sugden, Robert (1986) The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
- Sugden, Robert (1995) ‘A theory of focal points’, Economic Journal (105), 1269–1302.Google Scholar
- Sugden, Robert (2002) ‘Beyond sympathy and empathy: Adam Smith’s concept of fellow-feeling’, Economics and Philosophy (18), 63–87.Google Scholar
- Tuomela, Raimo (1995) The Importance of Us (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press).Google Scholar