Abstract
Almost all decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. Each individual is represented as making decisions in the light of his or her own preferences and beliefs. A person may have preferences about consequences of her actions which affect other people; but these are still her preferences. She may have beliefs about what other people will choose; but these are still her beliefs. In making decisions, she acts alone.
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© 2005 Robert Sugden
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Sugden, R. (2005). The Logic of Team Reasoning. In: Gold, N. (eds) Teamwork. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523203_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523203_9
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