Teamwork pp 181-199 | Cite as

The Logic of Team Reasoning

  • Robert Sugden


Almost all decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. Each individual is represented as making decisions in the light of his or her own preferences and beliefs. A person may have preferences about consequences of her actions which affect other people; but these are still her preferences. She may have beliefs about what other people will choose; but these are still her beliefs. In making decisions, she acts alone.


Game Theory Common Reason Joint Action Decision Theory Inference Rule 
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© Robert Sugden 2005

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  • Robert Sugden

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