Teamwork pp 78-101 | Cite as

The Evolution of Teams

  • David P. Myatt
  • Chris Wallace


Many economic and social activities require a critical number of individuals (referred to here as a ‘team’) to participate in order to ensure the success of a given project or task. As a result, these kinds of activities frequently experience the well-known problems associated with collective actions.1 Focus here is directed at two such problems. First, such activities can involve a positive externality: participation in a team leads to a private cost borne by the individual, but the benefits of the team’s efforts accrue to all. Second, successful team formation requires coordination: absent the participation of a sufficient number of individuals, the project as a whole would fail.2


Nash Equilibrium Public Good Simple Game Team Size Private Cost 
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© David P. Myatt and Chris Wallace 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • David P. Myatt
  • Chris Wallace

There are no affiliations available

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