Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas

  • Andrew Hurrell


The 1990s witnessed a very significant expansion of regional institutions and important changes in the ambition, scope and density of regional governance in the Americas. These changes followed partly from the creation of regional economic integration schemes (as with NAFTA and Mercosur) and from the ongoing process of negotiation for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). All of these involve “deep integration” and the detailed international regulation of a wide range of previously domestic issues. In the political area, the 1990s saw a revitalization of the efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS) to establish democracy as a regional norm and to act collectively in the defense of democracy. The agendas of successive Summits of the Americas (Miami 1994, Santiago 1998, Quebec 2001) reveal an extraordinary range of issues, many of which — for example, corruption, money laundering and military relations — would have been very hard to imagine as legitimate topics for inter-American debate, let alone action, even a few years before. There was even a resurgence of security regionalism (for example, in the form of regular hemispheric defense Ministeriais) and increased international debate about the new security challenges facing the region (most notably in relation to drugs and transnational crime).


Foreign Policy Weak State Money Laundering Regional Institution Regional Governance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See Frederick M. Abbott, “NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study,” in Judith L. Goldstein et al., Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Realism, Structural Liberalism, and the Western Order,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 109–10.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Todd Eisenstadt, “The Rise of the Mexican Lobby: Even Further from God and Even Closer to the United States,” in Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesus Velasco (eds), Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico-US Relations (1997). Cuba and the Cuban lobby also comes in here, but this is a very particular case. See Jorge Dominguez, “US-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Fall 1997).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games,” reprinted in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobsen and Robert D. Putnam (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 450.Google Scholar
  6. On the extent to which the NAFTA negotiations confirmed this prediction, see Cameron and Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), especially p. 230.Google Scholar
  7. 6.
    For the straightforward imposition thesis, see James Petras and Morris Morley, US Hegemony Under Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin America (London: Verso, 1990).Google Scholar
  8. 7.
    Andrew F. Cooper, “The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism,” International Studies Perspectives 5 (1) (February 2004), 92–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 8.
    Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See pp. 93–167 for his analysis of the Western Hemisphere.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    As, for example, with Lisa Martin’s examination of multilateral economic sanctions. See Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially pp. 27–8.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    G.J. Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror,” Survival 43, 4 (Winter 2001), p. 27. See also After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. For a realist version of this idea, see Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 147.Google Scholar
  14. 13.
    R. Foot, N. MacFarlane and M. Mastanduno, “Conclusion: Instrumental Multilateralism in US Foreign Policy,” in US Hegemony and International Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 14.
    See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 15.
    On soft and co-optive power, see Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), especially chapter 6.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    As one of the major analysts of these developments herself notes: “In particular, government networks can be seen as a way of avoiding the universality of international organization and the cumbersome formality of their procedures that is typically designed to ensure some measure of equality of participation.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Governing through government networks,” in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 199.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Nico Krisch, “More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law,” in Georg Nolte and Michael Byers (eds), The United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).Google Scholar
  19. 20.
    See Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds), The Rebordering of North America (London: Routledge, 2003).Google Scholar
  20. 21.
    Quoted in Jennifer Welsh, At Home in the World (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), p. x.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Andrew Hurrell 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Hurrell

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations