Security Regulation or Community? Canada, Mexico, and the Borders of Identity

  • S. Neil MacFarlane
  • Mónica Serrano


When NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) was ratified in 1993, it established the world’s first non-colonial integration scheme between two developed states and a developing country. By 2001, the experiment seemed so successful that the World Bank could issue a report recommending it for adoption elsewhere.1 Over twenty years of NAFTA, Mexico’s total trade has increased sevenfold; that of Canada and the US more than doubled. Trade between Canada and Mexico increased by 152 per cent after 1994.2 US annual merchandise trade with Canada and Mexico has gone up from US$300 billion in 1993 to US$600 billion.


Free Trade Security Community Regional Integration Regional Identity North American Free Trade Agreement 
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Copyright information

© Neil S. MacFarlane & Mónica Serrano 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. Neil MacFarlane
  • Mónica Serrano

There are no affiliations available

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