Abstract
Hegel is the philosopher of threes. In the Encyclopedia system, there is logic–nature–spirit. Within logic, there is being-essence-notion. Within notion, there is subject–object–idea. Within subjectivity, there is notion– judgment–syllogism. Yet, as everyone notices, when it comes to judgment, the structure is tetrachotomous. Here we find existence–reflection–necessity– notion. Why should there by four judgments when there are only three of everything else? Why must Shemp intrude upon the sublime perfection of Moe, Larry and Curly? What need we d’Artagnan when Porthos, Athos and Aramis seem the perfect threesome? Three’s company. Four’s a crowd!
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© 2005 David Gray Carlson
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Carlson, D.G. (2005). Why Are There Four Hegelian Judgments?. In: Carlson, D.G. (eds) Hegel’s Theory of the Subject. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522626_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522626_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-54671-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-52262-6
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