Abstract
The forms of judgment are widely recognized to be central to thinking and to knowing objectivity. Seldom, however, have the necessity, interrelation, and completeness of these forms been investigated. Although Kant can be credited for having brought them to center stage, he is notorious for failing to account for their diversity or for that of the categories he finds rooted in each form. As he himself would have to admit, assurances that judgment is found in certain shapes relating terms through certain concepts will not suffice for any claims holding universally for either thinking or objective knowledge. At best, what is culled from tradition or psychological observation can support corrigible descriptive claims of contingent local application.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2005 Richard Dien Winfield
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Winfield, R.D. (2005). The Types of Universals and the Forms of Judgment. In: Carlson, D.G. (eds) Hegel’s Theory of the Subject. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522626_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522626_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-54671-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-52262-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)