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Moral Hazard, Contracts and Social Preferences: A Survey

  • Florian Englmaier
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

This chapter provides a non-technical survey of recent contributions to the emerging field of behavioural contract theory that try to incorporate social preferences into the analysis of optimal contracts in situations of moral hazard. The presence of these social preferences is confirmed by numerous studies. Taking them into account when analysing optimal contracts generates important new insights, and might help us gain a better understanding of real-world contracts and organizational structures.

Keywords

Social Preference Optimal Contract Participation Constraint Team Production Moral Hazard Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Economic Association 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Florian Englmaier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MunichGermany

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