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Human Reproduction and Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach

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Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

The basic models of game theory and economics involve individual utility or payoff functions. Each player or participant is characterized by his set of strategies and exogenously-given payoff function. He independently sets his strategy, which influences not only his payoff, but also the payoffs of other participants. The models describe an individual’s behaviour as aimed at maximizing his payoff function. The theory studies methods and outcomes of rational strategic choices. A standard assumption is that each player knows the payoff functions of all participants. The case of incomplete information about the payoff functions of other players is also studied; for instance, through the Bayesian (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) and maximin (see Germeyer, 1976) approaches. Note that under both complete and incomplete information the payoff functions are exogenously given and do not change.

* A large part of this chapter was prepared during my visit to the Carlos III University, Madrid, in 2002. I am grateful to the Department of Economics for its hospitality. Financial support of this research by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport of Spain and the Russian Fund for Basic Research grant 02-01-00610 is gratefully acknowledged. I thank participants in the seminars at Alicante, Bilbao and Madrid, for useful discussion. My special thanks to Jim Leitzel and the editors of this volume for many useful proposals on refinement and clarification of the text.

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© 2005 International Economic Association

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Vasin, A.A. (2005). Human Reproduction and Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach. In: Agarwal, B., Vercelli, A. (eds) Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522343_5

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