Rationality, Learning and Complexity

  • Alessandro Vercelli
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

Although standard economic theory is based on methodological individualism, this does not imply that individuals play a crucial role in economic models. On the contrary, in such a theory individuals are deprived of authentic subjective features and play no significant role as genuine subjects. The so-called homo economicus is characterized by given preferences that are conceived as exogenous and invariant over time. Therefore, the genuine psychological features of an economic agent do not matter.

Keywords

Recombination Coherence Assure Librium Boulder 

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Copyright information

© International Economic Association 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Vercelli
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SienaItaly

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