Beginning and End? The Two German Unifications and the Epoch of Territoriality

  • Johannes Paulmann
Part of the New Perspectives in German Studies book series (NPG)


Is there a story to be told about the two German unifications forming part of a single narrative with a beginning and an end?1 How can we link the first and second unification if not through a nationalist narrative? What are the appropriate reference points if we wish to compare 1870–1 with 1989–90? These questions are fraught with political implications and the path to their answer littered with historical traps. As we try to find our way through, major unforeseen events — such as the breakdown of the Soviet Empire and the second unification of Germany — give historians an excellent opportunity to search for a beginning of the end.


Austrian Emperor Identity Space Euro Pean Unifica Tion European Politics 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2005

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  • Johannes Paulmann

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