Abstract
We develop the standard (two-country, one-good, two-factor) model of international immigration, in which we have unemployment in the host (capital abundant) country and in the foreign (labor abundant) country. Our main result is that the introduction of a profit-sharing plan by the host country causes: (1) Employment of domestic labor increases, (2) immigration decreases, (3) the domestic (foreign) country’s welfare rises (falls), and, under certain circumstances, (4) global welfare rises in the presence of international capital immobility.
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© 2005 Chisato Yoshida and Alan D.Woodland
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Yoshida, C., Woodland, A.D. (2005). Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing. In: The Economics of Illegal Immigration. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230514881_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230514881_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51498-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-51488-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)