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The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration

  • Chisato Yoshida
  • Alan D. Woodland

Abstract

The present chapter re-examines the Bond and Chen (1987) model on illegal immigration, introducing a government budget constraint (GBC) on the host country’s government. It examines the effects of financing internal enforcement of illegal immigration by the host-country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting) country and the world, both in the absence and in the presence of international capital mobility. The aim of this chapter is to determine whether internal enforcement may be a Pareto-improving policy.

Keywords

Host Country Welfare Effect Domestic Firm Domestic Worker Capital Mobility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Chisato Yoshida and Alan D.Woodland 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chisato Yoshida
  • Alan D. Woodland

There are no affiliations available

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