The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility

  • Chisato Yoshida
  • Alan D. Woodland

Abstract

Using the Bond and Chen (1987) model of illegal immigration, we re-examine the effects of internal enforcement by the host country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting) country and the world, when capital is internationally mobile between countries. Our main result is that the internal enforcement policy increases the foreign country’s welfare and global welfare and, under certain conditions, increases the host country’s welfare. Therefore, we conclude that enforcement is a Pareto-improving policy potentially.

Keywords

Migration Income Dition Alan Rile 

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Copyright information

© Chisato Yoshida and Alan D.Woodland 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chisato Yoshida
  • Alan D. Woodland

There are no affiliations available

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