Abstract
With Labour’s election to office, African affairs rose considerably higher up the UK’s list of foreign policy priorities.1 This trend was reinforced in the aftermath of 9/11 when Blair signalled his support for the NEPAD and argued that something had to be done to heal a continent that had become ‘a scar on the conscience of the world’.2 In economic terms, after the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in June 2002, Blair committed his government to spending £1 billion on development aid to Africa by 2006. Nearly two years later, in February 2004, Blair launched a 17 member Commission for Africa tasked with taking ‘a fresh look at Africa’s past and present, and the international community’s role, in order to agree clear recommendations for the future’. The Commission published its report, Our Common Interest in March 2005.
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Notes
Blair’s personal commitment to African issues was particularly important given that in 1998, his Foreign Secretary reportedly rejected a proposal that he visit Ghana and South Africa, saying that it was a waste of his time. ‘A far of F country’, Economist, 14 May 1998.
See John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London: Free Press, 2003), pp. 65, 73.
See Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: the politics of securitisation and fear’, Alternatives, 30 (2005), pp. 55–80.
See Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Christopher Clapham, ‘Degrees of Statehood’, Review of International Studies, 24: 2 (1998), pp. 147–8.
See Richard Dowden, ‘Blair throws a lifeline to Africa’, The Tablet (online), 16 Feb. 2002.
Christopher Clapham, ‘Discerning the new Africa’, International Affairs, 74: 2 (1998), pp. 265–6.
Although Labour helped facilitate some high-prof Ile mediation efforts in the DRC (mainly since 2002), it has committed only limited resources to the peace process and been quite content to let South Africa and Zambia bear the majority of the diplomatic burden. The UK government was also criticised for being too sof T on Rwanda and Uganda over their interventions in the DRC and for underestimating the impact that resource exploitation on the course of the war and attempts to resolve it (see Chapter 7). See All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention, Cursed by Riches: Who Benefits from Resource Exploitation in the DRC (Nov. 2002), p. 36.
Comfort Ero, ‘A critical assessment of Britain’s Africa policy’, Conflict, Security and Development, 1: 2 (2001), pp. 60–61.
Alice Walpole, ‘British perspective on the P3 Initiative for enhancing African peacekeeping capability’, in Resolute Partners (Pretoria: ISS Monograph No. 21, Feb. 1998).
See Randolph Martin, ‘Sudan’s perfect war’, Foreign Affairs, 81: 2 (2002), pp. 111–27.
See Peter Hain, ‘Angola needs our help’, speech to ACTSA, London, 20 Nov. 1999.
Blair’s stance was reminiscent of the previous Conservative government’s policy of defeating the RUF through military means. To this end, in 1994 the Conservatives had supported a private military company employing 58 Gurkha soldiers in what turned out to be an unsuccessful campaign against the RUF. ‘A far-of F country’, Economist, 14 May 1998.
See Paul Williams, ‘Fighting for Freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone’, Contemporary Security Policy, 22: 3 (2001), pp. 140–68.
See ‘Four die in first clash with British’, Guardian, 18 May 2000. Although four dead rebels was the of Ficial total, the real death toll was considerably higher. See Damien Lewis, Operation Certain Death (London: Century, 2004).
For details see Richard Connaughton, ‘Operation “Barrass” ’, Sniall Wars & Insurgencies, 12: 2 (2001), pp. 110–19; Lewis, Operation Certain Death.
See Peter Penfold, ‘Will justice help peace?’, The World Today, 58: 11 (2002), pp. 21–3.
Robin Cook, ‘Conflict prevention in the modern world’ speech to the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 Sept. 1999.
Greg Austin, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools (DFID Report EVSUM EV647, 2004).
In December 1999, and in the absence of credible military threats, the African National Congress (ANC) Government entered into five major arms purchase transactions with foreign suppliers now expected to cost R66.7 billion (approximately £5 billion). This deal, the ‘new’ South Africa’s largest ever public expenditure programme, included 9 Swedish/British advanced light Gripen fighter aircraft (with an option to acquire 19 more in 2004); and 12 BAE Hawk fighter trainer aircraft (with an option to purchase 12 more in 2002). Local media suggested the decision to select the BAE Hawks, over the newer, lighter and cheaper (reportedly half the price) Italian-designed Aeromacchi, was closely related to personal links between former Minister of Defence, the late Joe Modise and BAE, numerous BAE-sponsored overseas trips for Cabinet Ministers, MP’s and government of Ficials, and BAE’s R5 million donation to the ANC’s MK Veterans Military Association. It should be noted that this equipment is almost all unsuited for use in peace operations.
See Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams, ‘Ethics and foreign policy: The antinomies of New Labour’s “Third Way” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Political Studies, 49: 2 (2001), pp. 254–8.
Tony Blair, ‘Facing the modern challenge: the third way in Britain and South Africa’, speech, Parliament Building, Cape Town, South Africa, 8 Jan. 1999.
Jubilee Research, Real Progress Report on HIPC (New Economics Foundation, Sept. 2003).
Nick Davies, ‘Africa aid game is all snakes and adders’, Guardian, 17 June 1999.
Charlotte Denny, ‘Hypocrisy that underlies HIPC’, Guardian, 6 Jan. 2003.
Gordon Brown, ‘The Challenges of 2005: forging a new compact for Africa’, New Economy, 11 3 (2004), p. 128.
Robin Cook, Promoting peace and prosperity in Africa’, speech to the UN Security Council, New York, 24 Sept. 1998.
Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2000).
See Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), Part 1.
Richard Dowden, ‘What’s wrong with Africa’, The Tablet (online), 16 Jan. 1999.
See Ian Taylor and Paul Williams ‘The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe’, International Affairs, 78: 3 (2002), pp. 547–65.
Christopher Hill, ‘Foreign Policy’ in Anthony Seldon (ed.), The Blair Effect (London: Little, Brown, 2001), p. 347.
Clare Short, ‘Can Africa halve poverty by 2015? The challenge to the new partnership for African development’, speech Johannesburg, South Africa, 4 April 2002.
See Ian Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’s development or another false start (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
For example, see Short, ‘Can Africa’ and ‘Why I take heart’, The Tablet (online), 6 Sept. 1997.
Gordon Brown, ‘We have much more to do’ speech to Labour party conference, Brighton, 27 Sept. 2004.
Christopher Clapham, ‘Introduction’, International A fjairs, 81: 2 (2005), p. 277.
Patrick Wintour, ‘We’ve got the script, now let’s make the film’, Guardian, 12 March 2005.
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© 2005 Paul D. Williams
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Williams, P.D. (2005). Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience?. In: British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997–2005. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230514690_5
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