Healing a Scar on the World’s Conscience?

  • Paul D. Williams


With Labour’s election to office, African affairs rose considerably higher up the UK’s list of foreign policy priorities.1 This trend was reinforced in the aftermath of 9/11 when Blair signalled his support for the NEPAD and argued that something had to be done to heal a continent that had become ‘a scar on the conscience of the world’.2 In economic terms, after the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in June 2002, Blair committed his government to spending £1 billion on development aid to Africa by 2006. Nearly two years later, in February 2004, Blair launched a 17 member Commission for Africa tasked with taking ‘a fresh look at Africa’s past and present, and the international community’s role, in order to agree clear recommendations for the future’. The Commission published its report, Our Common Interest in March 2005.


Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Policy Good Governance African State Southern African Development Community 
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Copyright information

© Paul D. Williams 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul D. Williams
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BirminghamUK

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