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Living in (and with) Europe

  • Paul D. Williams

Abstract

Labour’s decision to develop a military capacity for the EU as part of the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been described as ‘perhaps the most remarkable, if not vote-catching, policy’ of Blair’s first term in office.1 Contrary to claims that the ESDP had been dealt a fatal blow by the Iraq crisis it weathered the storm.2 Although the Union’s members fell short of meeting their own optimistic targets, in 2003 ESDP took its first practical steps in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). That the UK played a backseat role to France in these operations was indicative of the lower priority Whitehall gave to the ESDP project after 9/11. However, events since 1997 can also be interpreted as a victory for the UK’s vision of ESDP as a necessary tactical instrument to reinvigorate its preferred Atlanticist strategy toward European security. This view was given added credibility when in December 2004, the Union established EUFOR, a 7000 strong peace operation designed to take over from NATO’s Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. EUFOR involved troops from 33 states and was led by the UK, which also contributed approximately 1000 soldiers. It also provided more evidence that the UK was prepared to support an ESDP that was complementary to NATO.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Security Council European Security Humanitarian Catastrophe Ground Troop 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Paul D. Williams 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul D. Williams
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BirminghamUK

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