Iraq and Labour’s Moment in the Middle East

  • Paul D. Williams


On 20 March 2003, US, British and Australian troops invaded Iraq as part of a US-led coalition. The stated objective was to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in order to implement the demands set out in a series of UN Security Council resolutions. Britain was the only state other than the US to ‘commit more than a token military force’, comprising nearly one-third of the invasion’s land power and ‘a significant portion of the air power’.1 Within four weeks US forces had taken control of Baghdad and on 2 May President Bush declared that major combat operations were over and the coalition was victorious. Victory did not mean the end of violence and by 10 May 2005, 1785 coalition troops were dead, including 88 Britons and 1606 Americans, the vast majority of whom died after Bush’s declaration of victory. In a breach of Article 16 of the First Geneva Convention of 1949, the coalition made no attempt to count the number of Iraqi casualties.


Foreign Policy Security Council Military Force International Peace Security Council Resolution 
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Copyright information

© Paul D. Williams 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul D. Williams
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BirminghamUK

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