Molotov pp 199-220 | Cite as

The Diplomat at War

  • Derek Watson
Part of the Studies in Russian and East European History and Society book series


Molotov’s lukewarm attitude towards Britain, a reflection of his pro-German sentiments, and the treaties with Germany, meant that despite the efforts of Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to the USSR from May 1940, there was little change in Anglo-Soviet relations from 1939 until Hitler launched Barbarossa.1 On 12 July 1941 Molotov and Cripps signed a joint agreement between Britain and the USSR. This pledged mutual aid and affirmed that neither country would conclude a separate peace. A trade and credit agreement was signed in August, but even after the ‘three-power conference’2 relations between the two countries remained poor. Stalin and Molotov were clearly dissatisfied with the limited aid they were receiving from Britain, which had not responded to enquiries about a Second Front, raised by Molotov with Cripps, and by Stalin with Churchill, as early as 18 July.3 Eden’s visit to Moscow, in December 1941, was a half-hearted and unsuccessful British attempt to foster improved relations and closer co-operation.


Foreign Minister Peace Treaty Soviet Government Western Power Polish Government 
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Copyright information

© Derek Watson 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Derek Watson
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Russian and East European StudiesThe University of BirminghamUK

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