Big Bang Reform Programme and After
In the early 1990s, the failure of government measures to revitalize the economy led to a loss of confidence in these packages. The aftermath of asset inflation revealed several problems in the regulatory framework, and it was suggested that Japanese authorities were committing the same policy mistakes as the US policy makers had done sometime back. Japan’s deposit guarantee system remains bimodal, makes little effort to impose discipline on depositors or shareholders and relies on a passive regulatory attitude.
KeywordsEurope Income Volatility Mellon
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.Financial System Research Council, Annual Report, 1997, pp. 17–18Google Scholar
- 4.Securities and Exchange Council, Annual Report, Tokyo, 1997, p. 14Google Scholar
- 6.Kurt Gorger, in Arne Holzhausen (ed.), Can Japan Globalize, Studies on Japan’s Changing Political Economy and the Process of Globalisation, Physica-Verlag, New York. 2001Google Scholar
- 8.Carl J. Lindgren et al., ‘Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia’, IMF Occasional Paper, Washington, 1986;Google Scholar
- also Jenny Corbett, ‘Japan’s Banking Crisis in International Perspective’, in Masahiko Aoki and Gary R. Saxonhouse (eds), Japanese Corporate Governance, Oxford, 2000Google Scholar
- 10.T. Hoshi and A. Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan, MIT Press, 2002, p. 256;Google Scholar
- 12.Jenny Corbett, ‘Crisis, What Crisis? The Policy Response for Japan’s Banking Crisis’, in Craig Freedman (ed.), Why Did Japan Stumble? Macquarie University Press, Sydney, 1997Google Scholar