Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Potential and Limits of Habibie’s Reforms

Abstract

After only 72 days as the country’s Vice-President, Professor B. J. Habibie was sworn in as the country’s third President since independence in 1945, and he was expected to undertake ‘corrective reforms’ where Suharto had failed and was forced to resign. What made things worst for Habibie was that he brought with him many negative images, including his penchant for ‘wasteful mega-projects’, his poor or lack of understanding about the workings of the economy, his lack of acceptance by ABRI, of being a front or tool for Islamic fundamentalism and probably worst of all, of being nothing more than a ‘pawn’ and ‘puppet’ of Suharto. This image was not helped by the fact that many viewed Habibie as being installed by his long-time friend and patron Suharto and where he was expected to serve out the remainder of Suharto’s five year term until 2003. In view of this, Habibie was viewed as nothing more than a transitional or interim figure, who became President by default of the constitution and whose role was to oversee peaceful change through ‘corrective reforms’ of the political and economic system.