Abstract
Islamabad had started to work on developing its nuclear capabilities in the 1970s, the program gaining speed after India’s nuclear explosion in 1974. The strategic imperative was paramount in establishing the nuclear program. With time, nuclear deterrence gained importance in the military strategic planning leading to a juncture where non-conventional defense was considered as the only viable option to fill the gaps in the country’s conventional defense.
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Notes
Raju G.C. Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990s (London: Adelphi Paper 278, July 1993 ), p. 68.
Kausar Niazi, Last Days of Premier Bhutto ( Lahore: Jung, 1991 ), p. 85.
Stephen M. Meyer. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, 1986), p. 63.
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© 2001 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
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Siddiqa-Agha, A. (2001). Mutually Assured Deterrence: the Nuclear Option. In: Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979–99. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230513525_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230513525_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40677-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-51352-5
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