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Nations, Conglomerates and Empires: Trade-off Between Income and Sovereignty

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Abstract

[There are three ways in which countries grow. First, by] ‘fonning a league consisting of several republics in which no one of them had preference, authority or rank above the others; and in which, when other cities were acquired, they made them constituent members in the same way as the Swiss act in our time, and as in Greece the Acheans and the Aetolians acted in olden tunes….The reason why such a republic cannot expand is that its members are distinct…which makes it difficult for them to consult and to make decisions. It means that they are less keen on acquiring dominion, for, since many communities share in that dominion, they do not appreciate further acquisition in the same way as does a single republic which hopes to enjoy the whole. Furthermore, a league is governed by a council, which must needs be slower in arriving at any decision….The second method consists in forming alliances in which you reserve to yourself the headship, the seat in which the central authority resides, and the right of mitiative. This was the method adopted by the Romans. The third method is to make other states subjects instead of allies, as the Spartans and the Athenians did…[This method] is quite useless, as can be seen in the case of the two republics just mentioned.

Keywords

Capita Income Domestic Market Median Voter Indifference Curve Core Member 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Branko Milanović 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.World BankResearch DepartmentWashington, D. C.USA

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