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The Anti-system Party

  • Gino G. Raymond
Part of the French Politics, Society and Culture Series book series (FPSC)

Abstract

As suggested in the conclusion to Chapter 2, the appeal of the PCF to the French electorate was in no small measure due to the certainty it represented when all around it seemed characterised by uncertainty and drift. Indeed, the continuity represented by the PCF at the height of its popularity could be contrasted with the debate about the very inception of the Fourth Republic. Historically, it could have been 25 August 1944, since that was the date on which the capital was liberated. Politically, the departure of de Gaulle from the presidency of the Conseil des ministres on 20 January 1946 was a watershed in terms of the break this constituted with the whole period of the Resistance. Juridically, however, one would opt for the period from October 1946 to January 1947, the creation of Paul Ramadier’s government and the establishment of new institutions, to situate the birth of a new constitutional system.

Keywords

Communist Party Presidential Election Central Committee European Economic Community Common Programme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
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Copyright information

© Gino G. Raymond 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gino G. Raymond
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BristolEngland

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