Philosophers on Play

  • Hayden Ramsay


Philosophical work on leisure, play, recreation, and even reflection, is a contemporary rarity. In this respect, philosophy has travelled far from its roots, for leisure was an important concern for many great philosophers of the past. In order to establish the philosophical significance of leisure and some associated concepts, and to introduce some of the ideas and distinctions that I will later rely on, I here consider some of this history. This brief look at the philosophical legacy of leisure will also help to establish playful and reflective leisure as ideas with some philosophical pedigree and potential.


Leisure Activity Good Life Moral Obligation Game Playing Language Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Hayden Ramsay 2005

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  • Hayden Ramsay

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