Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes
An appreciation is given in this chapter of what is now known about the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes. There is little public information about Iraq’s programmes other than that elucidated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and its successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and then more recently the information in the ISG Comprehensive Report of 30 September 2004. Nevertheless, the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes are in many respects more comprehensively described than are comparable programmes for other countries. The starting point for the following account of Iraq’s proscribed programmes is the United Nation’s account of the series of declarations made by Iraq. After the defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal in August 1995, Iraq provided new chemical, biological and missile declarations. And on 7 December 2002, Iraq provided a further declaration that UNMOVIC said in essence repeated the information in the earlier declarations. Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, could be confirmed although such information was critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC had information that conflicted with the information in the declaration. Additional detail was provided in the ISG Comprehensive Report of 30 September 2004.
KeywordsBotulinum Toxin Nerve Agent Mass Destruction Chemical Weapon Biological Weapon
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 3.Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, three volumes, 30 September 2004.Google Scholar
- 5.Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. I, 30 September 2004, p. 30.Google Scholar
- 6.Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. I, 30 September 2004, p. 9.Google Scholar
- 7.Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. III, 30 September 2004, p. 33.Google Scholar
- 11.David Kay, Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003. Available at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affaris/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html.Google Scholar