The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group

  • Graham S. Pearson
Part of the Global Issues Series book series (GLOISS)

Abstract

In both the United Kingdom and the United States, unclassified documents were issued in September and October 2002 respectively by the two governments setting out why action needed to be taken against Iraq. The UK Government issued a 53 page dossier1 entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’ and the Central Intelligence Agency of the US Government issued a 28 page report2 entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.’ These two documents reached largely similar conclusions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see Table 7.1). The foreword to the UK dossier signed by Prime Minister Tony Blair stated:

What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.

Keywords

Fermentation Uranium Chlorine Bacillus Burial 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Graham S. Pearson 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham S. Pearson
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BradfordUK

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