An Analysis of UNSCOM

  • Graham S. Pearson
Part of the Global Issues Series book series (GLOISS)

Abstract

Although UNSCOM functioned for over seven years, there was relatively little published analysis of the work of UNSCOM and what this meant for non-proliferation until after UNSCOM ceased to function in Iraq.1 In part, this was because in the early 1990s it would have been premature to jump to conclusions as it is only since 1995 that a fuller appreciation of the extent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes have become clear. Another contributing factor in the early years of UNSCOM was the importance of maintaining confidentiality in the face of Iraqi non-cooperation when it was vitally important to maintain pressure on Iraq to make full, final and complete disclosures (FFCDs) of its proscribed programmes. In the later 1990s the approach changed, with UNSCOM making presentations to Iraq at the political level of what the Commission’s appreciation is of the proscribed programmes in an attempt to expedite the completion of the Commission’s work.

Keywords

Assure Resi Argentina Kelly Dura 

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation, Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1999.Google Scholar
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    Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation, Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1999.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Memorandum by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, Iraq’s … Biological Weapons Programme: UNSCOM’s experiences, 20 November 1996, circulated to States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November-6 December 1996.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 25 November-6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva 1996.Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500 dated 31 January 1992.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.Google Scholar
  7. 9.
    Chemical Weapons Conventions Bulletin, Criminalizing BW, CWCB Issue No. 31, March 1996.Google Scholar
  8. 10.
    CBW Conventions Bulletin, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law, CWCB Issue No. 42, December 1998. See also editorial International criminal law and sanctions to reinforce the BWC in CBW Conventions Bulletin, CBWCB Issue No. 54, December 2001.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Graham S. Pearson 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham S. Pearson
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BradfordUK

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