Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned

  • Graham S. Pearson
Part of the Global Issues Series book series (GLOISS)

Abstract

The experience gained from the United Nations’ activities in respect of inspection, verification and non-proliferation over the past 20 years searching for WMD in Iraq is extensive. Iraq was essentially, apart from the initial Secretary-General investigations, uncooperative. However, lessons can and should be drawn from this experience in Iraq for the international permissive regimes prohibiting biological and chemical weapons — for the Geneva Protocol, for the BTWC and for the CWC — and for the future strengthening of these regimes.

Keywords

Expense IAEA Dock Iraq Kuwait 

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Copyright information

© Graham S. Pearson 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham S. Pearson
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BradfordUK

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