Security Diplomacy, 1924–26

Abstract

British policy towards the innumerable crises associated with reparations payments, disarmament and international security in the early 1920s was always one of strictly limited involvement. Consideration of the needs of the empire and a belief that the European diplomatic situation was very complex led the British government to conclude that a more flexible policy might result in Britain becoming involved in a wide range of problems that had little bearing on her interests. Increasing emphasis was placed on the work of the League of Nations and reinforcing and improving Britain’s relationship with France.¹ The diplomatic crisis of 1923 that had failed to produce British support for the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, placed a severe strain on Anglo-French relations. It was for this reason that D’Abernon’s attempt to resurrect the Cuno proposals for a security pact based on French undertakings not to use the Rhineland for military purposes had been rejected by the then Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin.² This scheme, first proposed by the German Chancellor in November 1922, suggested that Britain, France, Germany and Italy should agree not to wage war against each other for thirty years without the prior authorisation of a plebiscite.³ The initiative coincided with a period of international stability greater than any which had existed since the war and which culminated in the signature of the Treaty of Locarno.