Conclusion

Abstract

This analysis of the thirty-year period between 1968 and 1999 demonstrates the central importance of international and European power motives in determining French policy on monetary co-operation and integration. This policy reflects all three forms of power motives in relation to the United States and Germany: negative, positive and veto.²¹¹ Each French initiative was a product of either negative or positive power motives in relation to both countries. In relation to the United States, most initiatives reflected negative power motives — to decrease the impact of dollar fluctuations upon the domestic economy. While the French continually sought to influence American international monetary policy, their positive power motives in relation to the Americans were realistically limited. Most initiatives also reflected both positive and negative power motives in relation to Germany. The principal objective was to influence German policy, although in doing so the French sought to diminish the external constraint of having to follow this policy. The formation of monetary policy after the establishment of EMU was to be a kind of veto power or shared power at the European level: in the ECB monetary policy is decided by majority voting. The independence of the ECB and the Bank of France also qualified this power considerably.