After Maastricht, December 1991 to January 1999: Keeping the EMU Project on Track and Challenging German Monetary Dominance

Abstract

European power motives ensured the general continuity of French government policy on the ERM and EMU during the seven years following the Maastricht summit to the start of Stage Three of the project on 1 January 1999. This was despite considerable economic and domestic political pressures to abandon, or at least significantly modify, the project and the frequently ambiguous rhetoric of leading politicians. Political developments encouraged speculation on a change in French policy: a close result in the 20 September 1992 French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, two changes in government — the overwhelming victory of the RPR—UDF in March 1993 and the surprise victory of the Socialist-led ‘Plural Left’ in June 1997 — and the election of a neo-Gaullist president, Jacques Chirac, in May 1995. The strength of these motives was such that in spite of the economic and political difficulties associated with the project, few formerly pro-EMU politicians switched camp during this period. First and foremost, French governments sought to keep the project on track in order to ensure the end of Bundesbank dominance by 1999 at the latest and, ideally, earlier if possible.¹⁸¹