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Economic Interventions

  • K. M. Fierke

Abstract

Policies regarding post-Cold War military interventions often posed difficult questions about who should intervene and whether action, to be legitimate, required support by the international community. They further revealed a conflict between national interest and support for international norms. Similarly, the history of economic intervention since the end of the Second World War has been shaped by the tension between profit and the interest of various states in exporting arms, on the one hand, and questions of principle related to limiting the proliferation of arms. In addition to various international agreements to stop the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, economic sanctions have, particularly since the end of the Cold War, been an important tool for limiting the access of dangerous regimes to WMD. Decisions to sell arms to another country, that is, engagement in the arms trade, are no less interventions that shape the potential or likelihood of war than decisions to withhold arms or military equipment, as a form of economic sanction.

Keywords

Security Council Biological Weapon Economic Sanction Security Council Resolution Economic Intervention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
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    For further reading on economic sanctions against South Africa, see: Richard Moorsom, Scope for Sanctions: Economic Measures against South Africa (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986); Mark Orken, Sanctions against Apartheid (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Audie Klotz et al., eds, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999); Robert R. Edgar, SanctioningApartheid (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990); Joe Hanlon, ed., South Africa: The Sanctions Report (London: Commonwealth Secretariat in Association with James Currey, 1990), and George W. Shepherd, Effective Sanctions on South Africa: The Cutting Edge of Economic Intervention (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).Google Scholar
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  19. 27.
    The political movements include the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, UNITA in Angola, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. See: David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).Google Scholar
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    For further readings on economic sanctions against Haiti, see: Elizabeth D. Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault (New York: Greenwood Press, 1999); Weiss, Cortright, Lopez and Minear, Political Gain and Civilian Pain; Cortright and Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions. Google Scholar
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    “Sanctions: Children Hard Hit in Haiti,” Children In War: The State of the Worlds Children 1996, http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/dsanctions.htm
  25. 35.
    For further reading on economic sanctions against Iraq, see: R. Thomas Naylor, Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busing and their Human Cost (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001); Tim Niblock, Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraqs Burdens: Oil, Sanctions and Underdevelopment (New York: Greenwood Press, 2002); Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions; Anthony Arnove, Iraq Under Siege; and Brown, Sanctioning Saddam. Google Scholar
  26. 36.
    Many accusations, particularly from the USA and the UK, have been leveled at Saddam Hussein in this regard. For instance, he has been accused of building presidential palaces, a stadium, and a lavish safari park while his people were suffering. The US government claimed that, under the Oil for Food program, he failed to order adequate baby foods, to order pulses-a main ingredient of Iraqi diets-and even of exporting food. UK Minister of Defense George Robertson accused Iraq of preventing medical supplies in Iraqi warehouses from reaching the population. See, respectively: Patrick Laws, “A Look at Sanctioning Iraq: The Numbers Don’t Lie, Saddam Does,” The Washington Post, February 27, 2000; US Department of State, “Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,” September 13, 1999, http://usinfo.state.govregional/neairaqiraq99.htm and George Robertson, “Bombing Iraq, Letter,” The Times, (London), March 6, 1999. It has been argued that many of these allegations proved to be unfounded or were based on misrepresentation and part of a campaign of vilification. See, for instance, Global Policy Forum “Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future,” August 6, 2002, http://www.globalpoiicy.org/securitysanction/iraql/2002/paper.htm
  27. 38.
    Peter Pellett, “Sanctions, Food, Nutrition and Health in Iraq,” in A. Arnove, Iraq Under Seige (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 151.Google Scholar
  28. 41.
    For a discussion of the effects of sanctions on Iraqi children, see: G. Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 127–8.Google Scholar
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    For an overview of issues raised by the Ethical Foreign Policy, see: Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, eds, Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Google Scholar
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    Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Speech by the Foreign Secretary: Human Rights into a New Century,” Daily Bulletin, July 17, 1997.Google Scholar
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    Robin Cook, “Britain is Ready to Pursue Justice in East Timor,” The Observer, September 19, 1999.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© K. M. Fierke 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. M. Fierke
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Politics and International StudiesQueen’s UniversityBelfastIreland

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