Military Interventions

  • K. M. Fierke

Abstract

The last two chapters explored moral and legal interventions that have shaped the way that war or intervention are justified and constructed. Each provided a more or less formal framework for making judgments about the conduct of war. The next two chapters shift to the more specific policy choices involved in different forms of intervention. Realist theory emphasizes the influence of material interests on policy. The rational decision is one defined in terms of the national interest in power. Power is first and foremost expressed as military capability, but the latter also relates to economic power, including the strength of the economy and the capacity to produce or purchase weapons. From this perspective, power rather than moral or legal principle motivates state policy or, at best, principle is a vehicle for realizing more material interests. To say, by contrast, that policies are social constructs is to focus on how power and principle combine in historically specific circumstances to bring about a particular configuration of relationships. One objective of the following two chapters is to explore how the relationship between material power and questions of moral principle combine in the construction of economic and military policy and practice.

Keywords

Europe Assure Turkey Hunt Defend 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    G. F. Hudson, “Threats of Force in International Relations,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 201.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–72.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (St Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 14.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Jackobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy; Schelling, Arms and Influence; Alexander George and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).Google Scholar
  5. 6.
    Schultz argues that democratic governments are at a disadvantage when it comes to coercive diplomacy. Internal divisions in democratic states make the state’s threat of force appear weak, which is a problem that autocratic regimes, where opposition is silenced, do not face. Democratic governments are susceptible to criticism from domestic opposition which can raise doubts about their willingness and ability to act. Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    For a discussion of Cold War nuclear strategy, see: Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); J. L. Gaddis, Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence; J. L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    However, as Graham Allison notes, the Turkish missiles were less than 3 percent of US capability to deliver a nuclear first strike on Soviet territory and were largely useless for a second strike because of their extreme vulnerability. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, CA: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 44.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    For further background on the Gulf War, see: Ian Johnstone, Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Lawrence Freedman, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (London: Faber and Faber, 1993); James Gow, ed., Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community (London: Brassey’s, 1993); and Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, Iraqs Road to War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).Google Scholar
  9. 10.
    See: James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst, 1997). For a discussion of why, despite its superior power, the USA found it so difficult in the post-Cold War period to achieve their objectives by threat alone, see: Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy,” in Demetrios James Caraley, ed., The New American Interventionism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    Indeed, as Keohane and Hozgreffe note, humanitarian intervention is a difficult concept because people often don’t believe that violence and war can be humanitarian on any grounds. There is an underlying suspicion that only self-interest motivates a country to action. J. Hozgreffe and R. Keohane, “Introduction,” Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).Google Scholar
  11. 12.
    Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper, 305 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 19.Google Scholar
  12. 14.
    Stanley Hoffman et al., The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 7.Google Scholar
  13. 16.
    For a more in-depth discussion of problems related to the overloading of the UN after the Cold War, see: Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 207–35, and Thomas G. Weiss, “Introduction,” Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).Google Scholar
  14. 17.
    See: Brian Urquhart, “The UN and International Security after the Cold War,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 82.Google Scholar
  15. 18.
    www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlanto PreventGenocide7Apri12004.htm
  16. 20.
    See: Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); O’Hanlan and O’Hanlan, who have defined more explicit military criteria, state that intervention should “mitigate suffering where that can be done with high confidence, modest cost and limited duration but should avoid open-ended commitments and high casualties.” Michele O’Hanlon and Michael O’Hanlon, Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1997), p. 3.Google Scholar
  17. 21.
    For further reading on the Somalia case, see: John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 1995); John Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia (London: Pluto Press, 1997); James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: UN Experience in Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds, Learning from Somalia: Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Thomas H. Henriksen, Clintons Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and North Korea (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1996); Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999).Google Scholar
  18. 22.
    “Ambush in Mogadishu, Chronology: The US/UN in Somalia,” Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/cron.html
  19. 23.
    For further reading on the Kosovo case, see: Martin Smit and Paul Latawski, The Kosovo Crisis: And the Evolution of a Post—Cold War European Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); Stephen D. Wrage, ed., Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect on the Air Campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (New York: Praeger, 2003); Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2002); Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds, War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), and Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: US Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).Google Scholar
  20. 24.
    Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 115–17.Google Scholar
  21. 25.
    Although it has been argued that if Kosovo had been on the table in Dayton it would not have been possible to secure the agreement. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1998).Google Scholar
  22. 28.
    Michael Malvesti, “Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists,” Terrorism and Violence, 13, 2 (2001).Google Scholar
  23. 29.
    Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Political Science Quarterly (2002).Google Scholar
  24. 30.
    Richard H. Schultz and Andreas Vogt, “The Real Intelligence Failure on 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First,” in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guildford, CT: McGraw Hill, 2003), p. 377.Google Scholar
  25. 32.
    See: Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War will be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster International, 2003).Google Scholar
  26. 34.
    Foreign Policy Association, “In Focus-Al Qaeda,” available from http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2478/newsletter_info.htm;accessed May 8, 2002; Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), p. 222.
  27. 36.
    Remarks by President Bush at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy; http://www.whithouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/200206013.html
  28. 37.
    National Security Strategy, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html
  29. 40.
    Neil C. Livingstone, “Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption and Retribution,” in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 219–27.Google Scholar
  30. 43.
    Neta Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,” Perspectives on Politics, 1, 1 (2003).Google Scholar
  31. 44.
    Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense news briefing, with General Richard Myers, October 22, 2001. Available at:www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/t10222001_t1022sd.html
  32. 46.
    Jean Beth Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: Ethics and the Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), and Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War.”Google Scholar

Copyright information

© K. M. Fierke 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. M. Fierke
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Politics and International StudiesQueen’s UniversityBelfastIreland

Personalised recommendations