Transatlantic Relations and European Security

  • Simon Duke
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


A series of attempts have been made since the end of the Cold War to make sense of the much changed international system. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’,1 Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’,2 Aron Wildavsky’s zones of conflict and zones of peace and Michael Doyle’s observations on liberal states’3 propensity not to engage in conflict with each other, are prime examples. Many of the ideas were driven by key articles, greeted as seminal, but like a young child with a new toy, they were soon discarded. Not unnaturally, theorising about the shape of the international system focused on the US role in the post-Cold War world. Two works in particular fuelled much of what became known as the declinist debate. First, Paul Kennedy’s book ‘The Rise and The Fall of The Great Powers’, speculated about whether the US would fall prey to modern variants of imperial overstretch, whereby ‘Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on “security” and thereby divert potential resources from “investment” and compound their long-term dilemma’.4 In the same year that Kennedy’s book appeared, David Calleo’s equally provocative Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance5 was published. Calleo argued that post-Cold War NATO was ‘essentially an American protectorate for Europe. As such, it is increasingly unviable’. Calleo further contended that it was global shifts that introduced fundamentally changed distributions of resources and power and that ‘even if the fundamental common interests of the United States and Western Europe dictate a continuation of the Atlantic Alliance… the old hegemonic arrangements cannot continue without becoming self-destructive’.6


Foreign Policy North Atlantic Treaty Organisation European Security Command Structure American Leadership 
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Notes and References

  1. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (3), Summer 1993, pp. 22–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. xxiii.Google Scholar
  3. David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For a more recent argument in the ‘declinist’ tradition, see Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).Google Scholar
  4. Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America’s Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67 (2) (Winter 1988/89), pp. 76–96.Google Scholar
  5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Change in the Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 261.Google Scholar
  6. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1769/1 ‘United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security’, 29 April 1947, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 40.Google Scholar
  7. Strobe Talbott, ‘Democracy and National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75(6), November/December 1996, p. 63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Barry M. Blechman, William J. Durch, David F. Gordon and Catherine Gwin with Todd Moss and Jolie M.F. Wood, The Partnership Imperative: Maintaining American Leadership in a New Era (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center and the Overseas Development Council, 1997), p. 1.Google Scholar
  9. Douglas Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, No. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 114–16. For an examination of the same theme see, Vincent A. Auger, ‘Seeking “Simplicity of Statement”: The Search for a New U.S. Foreign Policy Doctrine’, National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1997, Vol. III (2), pp. 1–21.Google Scholar
  10. Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘Clothed Ambition: Warren Christopher’, The New Republic, Vol. 208 (5) p. 25. See also Jurek Martin, ‘Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, The Financial Times, 18 August 1994, p. 5; and ‘William Jefferson Bonaparte’, The Economist, 17 September 1994, p. 25.Google Scholar
  11. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Back to the Womb?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74(4), July/August 1995, p. 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Philip H. Gordon, ‘Does the WEU Have a Role?’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1), Winter 1997, p. 131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. William Branigin, ‘One in 10 Americans is Foreign-Born’, Guardian Weekly, Vol. 156 (16), 20 April 1997, p. 15. The report also points out that the racial and ethnic make-up of the foreign born population has also changed strikingly. Nearly 85.8 percent of the foreign born who arrived before the 1970s were whites, that proportion dropped to 62.1 percent for the first six years of the 1990s. During the same period, the percentage of African-Americans more than doubled, to 8.7 percent, and the proportion of Asians and Pacific Islanders tripled to 28.6 percent. Hispanics (who may be of any race) accounted for 43 percent of newcomers since 1990 and 32.2 percent before 1970. The Census Bureau lists the current U.S. population as 84.2 percent white, 13.3 percent black, 1.6 percent Asian–Pacific Islander, and 7.4 percent classified as Hispanic.Google Scholar
  14. For a contrasting view on this issue see Philip Gordon, ‘Recasting the Alliance’, Survival, Vol. 38(1), Spring 1996, pp. 32–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The West: Unique, Not Divided’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75 (6), November/December 1996, p. 44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995) p. 3.Google Scholar
  17. Sir Leon Brittan commented, ‘It comes as no surprise to me that the first meeting you are holding should be with the representatives of the European Union. It comes as no surprise, but a great pleasure’. In Remarks by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans von Mierlo, and the Vice President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, The U.S.–EU Ministerial, Remarks to the Press, 28 January 1997 (Washington DC: Department of State, 1997).Google Scholar
  18. Charles Kupchan, ‘Reviving the West’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, Vol. 75 (3), pp. 92–105; and Simon Serfaty, ‘America and Europe Beyond Bosnia’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19(3), Summer 1996, pp. 31–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Charles Kupchan, ‘Reviving the West’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May/June 1996, p. 94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1959), p. 402.Google Scholar
  21. For a full discussion of the Helms-Burton legislation from a European perspective, see Kinka Gerke, ‘The Transatlantic Rift over Cuba, The Damage is Done’, The International Spectator, Vol. XXXII(2), April–June 1997, pp. 27–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Simon Duke, The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment (London: Macmillan, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Stuart Eizenstat, ‘Why Europe Must Forge Stronger Security Links’, Financial Times, 2 December 1995, quoted in Terrence R. Guay, ‘The European Union’s Intergovernmental Conference: Pressures for a Common Defence Policy’, National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1997, Vol. III (2), p. 51.Google Scholar
  24. G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans- Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1998), p. 83.Google Scholar
  25. James B. Steinberg, Advancing NATO’s Adaptation, Remarks by the Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, before the Atlantic Council of the US, 13 June 1996 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1996).Google Scholar
  26. David S. Huntington, ‘A Peacekeeping Role for the Western European Union’, in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 437.Google Scholar
  27. Jim Eberle, ‘NATO’s higher command’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Military Power in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1990).Google Scholar
  28. Yves Boyer, ‘WEU: A French Perspective’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Western European Union 1954–1997: Defence, Security, Integration (Oxford: St Antony’s College, 1997), p. 68.Google Scholar
  29. Anthony Cragg, ‘Internal Adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the challenges of tomorrow’, NATO Review, Vol. 45 (4) July–August 1997, p. 33.Google Scholar
  30. Thomas Halverson, ‘Disengagement by Stealth: The Emerging Gap Between America’s Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European Conflicts’, Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwells Publishers, 1994), pp. 76–94.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Simon Duke 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Duke
    • 1
  1. 1.European Institute of Public AdministrationMaastrichtNetherlands

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