Abstract
One outcome from the discussion of the effectiveness of aid intervention is to query how seriously aid sanctions have been applied in many instances. This links strongly to the major issue regarding donor application of aid sanctions, that of consistency. As discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.4.1), a number of commentators have queried whether donors would implement aid restrictions in an objective and equal manner, pointing to the precedent of selective and uneven application of human rights conditionality by the Carter administration in the late 1970s (Forsythe 1988, pp. 51–60; Nelson and Eglinton 1992, p. 28). The issue of consistency in application has also been a main concern of representatives of recipient governments, (for example, Greenidge in The Courier No.155, 1996). What does the empirical evidence suggest? Has the practice of Northern governments improved in the post-cold war period? Alternatively, has inconsistency continued to prevail?
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© 2001 Gordon Crawford
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Crawford, G. (2001). Consistency. In: Foreign Aid and Political Reform. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230509245_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230509245_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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