Abstract
Weizenbaum is summarising the programme of the reductionist scientist who insists that we are nothing but atoms, molecules, cells and organs, and these can be chemically analysed and mechanically explained. As Greta Garbo said, love is only a chemical reaction! This is an incomplete explanation and does not explain the human characteristics that distinguish us from animals and machines. In order to argue for such a distinction we will consider in this chapter computers, animals, mind and brain, the concept of a person, the self, free-will, values and our religious propensity.
Because of the prestige of science as a source of power and because of the general neglect of philosophy, the popular Weltanschauung (world view) of our times contains a large element of what may be called ‘nothing-but’ thinking. Human beings … are nothing but bodies, animals, even machines … values are nothing but illusions that have somehow got themselves mixed up with our experience of the world; mental happenings are nothing but epiphenomena … spirituality is nothing but … and so on.
Weizenbaum
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Notes
David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, p. 51
R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind. Vintage, London, 1994, pp. 19, 45, 52ff
S. Rose, The Making of Memory. Bantam, London, 1992, pp. 3, 87, 317f
J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason. Penguin, Middlesex, 1976, p. 208f. A good discussion of computers, artificial intelligence and the human soul, is in God and the Mind Machine, SPCK, London, 1996, p.135f, by John Puddefoot. He argues that mind grows distinguishing it from the artificial intelligence of the most advanced machines.
G. C. Davenport, Essential Psychology. HarperCollins, London, 1992, p. 70
O. Hanfling, Body and Mind, A313 units 1–2, Open University, Milton Keynes, 1980 pp. 45, 60
Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind. OUP, Oxford, 1989, p. 426. He cites the case of a chimpanzee who was closed in a room with a box and a banana suspended from the ceiling, just out of his reach. After a number of vain attempts he appeared to think about the problem. His eyes moved from the banana to the empty space beneath it on the ground, from this to the box, then back to the space, and from there to the banana. Suddenly he gave a cry of joy, and somersaulted over to the box in high spirits. He pushed the box below the banana and reaching up got the prize.
R. D. Gross, Psychology. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1991, p. 182
R. Popkin and A. Stroll, Philosophy. Doubleday, New York, 1956, p. 185
Alun Anderson, ‘Zombies, Dolphins, and Blindsight’, New Scientist, 4th May 1996, p.20f
F. Crick, What Mad Pursuit. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1989, p. 115
Ibid pp. 149–63. R. L. Gregory, Mind in Science. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1981, p. 557
Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy. Sinclair Stevenson, London, 1994, p. 550. J. Searle agrees with Penrose, and refers to the analogy of the computer. A computational role can be assigned to a system but only if it used as such. The question arises: Who is using this brain in such a way? He supposes that I am alone in a room with a set of instructions which tell which cards to pass to those outside in response to their cards. The cards carry Chinese characters and the instructions demand that I must pass out answers in that language though I do not understand it. A computer could be programmed to do it and give all the correct responses to a given input without understanding but a person must understand. Perhaps Searle needs to take more account of the advances in computers but he is right about the mind not simply responding to input from the outer world but being perceptive and creative.
A. Thatcher, Truly a Person, Truly God. SPCK, London, 1990, p. 109. He has an enlightening discussion of person. See in particular chapters 7, 8 and 9 based on
P. F. Strawson, Individuals, Methuen, London, 1990, p. 101f
D. Scully, God and Reason. CEM, London, 1989, p. 65. He says the acceptance of the natural principle of the survival of the fittest has meant competition, greed, self-preservation, leading to domination, power and wealth, the exploitation of the third world, poverty and debt, and the depletion of the earth’s resources.
T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th edn. OUP, Oxford, 1994, p. 503
S. Hawking, Black Holes and Baby Universes. Bantam, 1994, p. 12
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© 1997 Robert Crawford
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Crawford, R. (1997). What are We?. In: The God/Man/World Triangle. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230509221_6
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