The Decline of German Naval Intelligence, 1917–1919

Abstract

At the request of President Woodrow Wilson, the American Congress declared on 6 April 1917 that a state of war existed between the United States and the German Empire. The debate over American participation in the war had been going on for a while. In the short term, Washington’s decision to join the Allies was triggered by Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917, with its complete disregard for the rights of neutrals.¹ But the origins of American intervention ran deeper. President Wilson entered the conflict ‘to make the world safe for democracy’, and the majority of the East Coast establishment had long preferred the ‘democratic’ Allies over the ‘autocratic’ Central Powers. Anglo-American ties, in particular, played an important role in shaping Americans’ perceptions of the conflict. On a more mundane level, trade between the United States and the Allies had reached huge proportions by early 1917, and the economic consequences for North America of an Allied defeat would have been considerable. Neither was a German victory in Washington’s strategic interest.² One historian has also implied that German covert operations on American soil contributed significantly to the United States drifting into the Allied camp.³