Abstract
In 1901, the Chief of the Admiralstab assigned German naval intelligence an apparently straightforward task, the ‘gathering of accurate and sufficient intelligence on the opponent (Gegner) so as to enable the Admiralstab to make appropriate preparations for the event of war’.1 However, until 1911 it was far from clear for German naval planners which navy would be their most likely opponent. Chancellor Bismarck, who was in office until 1890, viewed Britain as a potential ally, and the Admiralstab’s operations planning was directed primarily at Russia and France. The German navy even counted on British naval support against France.2 In 1892, Naval Captain Tirpitz, then Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, submitted a memorandum to the Kaiser outlining contingency plans against Germany’s most likely foes, France and Russia, adding: ‘As soon as the English fleet can be regarded as hostile to the French, we will only have to focus on Russia in the European theatre.’3 In effect, the main purpose of the German navy would be to keep the French and Russian navies separated. However, as soon as Tirpitz became Secretary of the Naval Office (1897), he changed his mind and explained to the Kaiser that Germany’s most dangerous foe to date was England.4
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Notes
Paul Kennedy, ‘Maritime Strategieprobleme der deutsch-englischen Flottenrivalität’, in H. Schottelius and W. Deist (eds), Marine und Marinepolitik (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972), p. 179.
Klaus-Volker Giessler, Die Institution des Marineattachés im Kaiserreich: Militärgeschichtliche Studien (Boppard: Boldt, 1976), p. 134.
Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 42.
Holger H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 101.
For the conception of honour among officers, see Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel translated by Anthony Williams (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1995), pp. 36–84.
Gustav Steinhauer, The Kaiser’s Master Spy: The Story as Told by Himself ed. S.T. Felstead (London: John Lane, 1930).
However, Steinhauer later repudiated this ‘title’, claiming that the British greatly exaggerated his espionage activities: Gustav Steinhauer, Der Detektiv des Kaisers: Spionage und Spionageabwehr (Berlin: Oestergaard, 1932), p. 161. Steinhauer’s memoirs were published simultaneously in German and English, with Felstead doing most of the writing and editing.
Gustav Steinhauer, Der Meisterspion des Kaisers: Was der Detektiv Wilhelms II. in seiner Praxis erlebte. Erinnerungen (Berlin: K. Voegels, 1930), pp. 171, 188; PRO, KV 1/39, MI5 historical reports, ‘G’ branch report for 1914, pp. 55ff.
Ibid., L. Goldberg, solicitor, ‘Kgl. (royal) Preuss. Geheimer Justizrat, Rechtskonsulat des Kaiserlich Deutschen Generalkonsulats’, to Director of Public Prosecutions, 23 September 1910. The official legal counsel to the German general consulate in London offered no evidence on Helm’s behalf to expedite the trial, but instead applied for bail.
For the political dimension of the Agadir crisis see: Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982).
Ralf Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (1852–1912): Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich (2 vols, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1997), 2, p. 533.
Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), p. 79.
Panikos Panayi, German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1815–1914 (New York, Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 53.
F. Burgdörfer, ‘Migration across the Frontiers in Germany’, in Walter F. Willcox (ed.), International Migrations (2 vols, New York: Gordon & Breach, 1969), 2, p. 343.
Armgaard K. Graves, The Secrets of the German War Office: By Late Spy of the German Government with the Collaboration of Edward Lyell Fox (New York: A.L. Burt, 1914), p. 14.
Volker R. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan: Genesis and Vefall einer innerpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II: (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971), p. 437.
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© 2004 Thomas Boghardt
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Boghardt, T. (2004). German Pre-War Espionage in Great Britain. In: Spies of the Kaiser. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230508422_4
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