Kant on Virtue

  • Nafsika Athanassoulis

Abstract

Many recent commentators have appealed to The Doctrine of Virtue in order to illustrate that Kant should not be criticized for not taking concepts such as virtue and character into account in his moral theory. It is indeed wrong to accuse Kant of ignoring virtue and character, but it is also wrong to assume that when Kant discussed virtue and character, and when Aristotle discussed virtue and character they were necessarily talking about the same thing. The quotes referred to in the previous chapter already hint at a radically different concept of virtue from the Aristotelian picture of gradual development and eventual harmony between the right reason and the right desire. It is important therefore to say a bit more about Kantian virtue. In doing so we will also consider whether Kantian virtue differs from Aristotelian virtue and, in part, whether Kant occasionally misinterprets Aristotle on virtue.

Keywords

Defend 

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Notes

  1. 40.
    Allison’s account of Gesinnung, and in particular (1990), p. 139.Google Scholar

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© Nafsika Athanassoulis 2005

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  • Nafsika Athanassoulis

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