Postscript Doing Justice: Criticism and Philosophy



Since the time of Socrates, the relationship between the philosopher and the polis has been a notoriously vexed and contentious topic. At the heart of this debate is a philosophical question concerning the very nature of philosophy itself. In this concluding postscript I will attempt to distinguish the kind of attention required of the social critic from that required of the philosopher, by commenting briefly on the activity in which each is engaged. Ultimately, however, I will suggest that criticism and philosophy can best be understood not as the respective projects of distinct individuals, but as complementary activities, each of which can be carried out from within the normative space occupied by its practitioners.


Moral Philosophy Religious Commitment Moral Problem Social Criticism Ethical Criticism 
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© Richard Amesbury 2005

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