Agreeing to Disagree: Toward a More Capacious Conception of Tradition
Thus far I have been arguing that social criticism — moral, but also the-oretical — requires not that we transcend our practices, but that we remain within them. Contrary to what thinkers like Rorty suggest, the distinctions on which the critic relies are internal to the practices whose “relation to reality” the platonist seeks to get into view. Ironically, it is precisely in attempting to transcend these practices that the platonist risks losing the critical capacity that, it was thought, required the sought-after “external” viewpoint. Thus, in rejecting the platonist’s putative point of view as illusory, we need not relinquish the resources required for rational dissent and critique. In this sense, I have been defending the adequacy of what I called “ordinary” — as opposed to platonistic — realism.
KeywordsDition Defend Stake Metaphor
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- 2.That such concerns about the adequacy of our moral discourse can arise after having renounced platonism is nicely brought out by James Lindemann Nelson, who writes that “it might be argued that those skeptical about ethics as a form of knowledge base their doubts on features of the language game that are plainly accessible — the prevalence and endurance of deep ethical disagreement, for example … Such observations do not require taking a ‘sideways on’ view of ethics but rely rather on the presumably laudable activity of describing differences among language games.” James Lindemann Nelson, “Review of Ethical Formation by Sabina Lovibond,” International Philosophical Quarterly 42(8) No. 168 (December 2002), 556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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- 4.MacIntyre suggests that our alleged present predicament is one “which almost nobody recognizes and which perhaps nobody at all can recognize fully.” MacIntyre, After Virtue, 4. However, it is worth noting that MacIntyre is not the first to have suggested such an “hypothesis.” Emile Durkheim, for example, suggested that “morality … is going through a real crisis.” He continues, “Our faith has been troubled; tradition has lost its sway; individual judgment has been freed from collective judgment.” Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1933), 408–409.Google Scholar
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