Norms, Interpretation, and Decision-Making: Derrida on Justice



In the previous chapter we examined Habermas’s attempt to overcome ethical parochialism and ensure agreement in judgments by grounding the validity of moral norms in terms of “what all could will.” I argued that moral norms should be conceived as constitutive of interests, rather than as contributing to their satisfaction. However, by rejecting Habermas’s principle of universalization (U), I may appear to be reinstating the thesis that we are “locked into what we happen to agree on” at a particular time and place.3 In this chapter we will examine an attempt to avoid these alternatives by distinguishing the inherent “deconstructibility” of laws from the “indeconstructibility” of justice.


Moral Judgment Moral Norm Moral Consideration Social Criticism Moral Criticism 
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© Richard Amesbury 2005

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