Abstract
In the industrial sector, China’s central planning had been even more entrenched than in the agricultural sector. State enterprises were theoretically owned by the ‘whole people’, yet workers and managers had no sense of owning any assets. Consequently they had little incentive to maximize the profits of these enterprises. Both the ministries involved and local governments often pursued objectives contradictory to the goal of profit maximization. Bureaucratic control had led to inefficient production, an absence of incentive mechanism and rigid price control which failed to reflect any relationship between supply and demand.
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© 2000 Wei-Wei Zhang
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Zhang, WW. (2000). Urban Reform. In: Transforming China. Studies on the Chinese Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230506350_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230506350_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40847-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-50635-0
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