Clash of Institutions: Clientelism and Corruption vs. Rule of Law

  • Christoph H. Stefes
Part of the Euro-Asian Studies book series (EAS)


Fifteen years after the fall of Soviet rule, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia remain plain examples of post-authoritarian transitions that have gone awry. There are differences between these three countries in terms of their political and economic developments. Freedom House, for example, has consistently ranked Armenia and Georgia above Azerbaijan in terms of economic liberalization and political democratization.1 Moreover, Georgia certainly fares better than Armenia in terms of democratic development, taking into account that Georgia recently witnessed the rise of a young and reformist elite to political power (winter 2003). In contrast, Armenia appears to be stuck with a government that does not tolerate any opposition to its rule, as the brutal crackdown of a recent attempt at replicating Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ has clearly demonstrated (spring 2004).


Civil Society Police Officer Supra Note Communist Party Corrupt Activity 
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© Christoph H. Stefes 2005

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  • Christoph H. Stefes

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