‘To a Knock-Out’: War Office and Political Crisis 1916

  • Andrew Suttie

Abstract

By the time of Kitchener’s death in June 1916, Lloyd George had completed his task at the Ministry of Munitions. The new ministry was well established, he had successfully wrested control of the munitions industry from the military, and British forces abroad were beginning to be adequately provided with shells, guns and other requirements. A move to the War Office was ostensibly a promotion, but the reduced powers of the office of Secretary of State meant that Lloyd George did not gain any significant influence over British strategy or military operations. His achievements were modest and his tenure frustrating. In any event he was Secretary of State for a mere five months, until political developments brought him to the Prime Ministership and thus greater power over and responsibility for the national war effort. How Lloyd George used Prime Ministerial power and how this is presented in the War Memoirs is the subject of subsequent chapters.

Keywords

Shipping Assure Military Position Lost Clarification 

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Notes

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© Andrew Suttie 2005

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  • Andrew Suttie

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