Munitions 1914–16

  • Andrew Suttie


The establishment and development of the Ministry of Munitions by Lloyd George in 1915–16 was one of the Asquith Coalition’s few success stories, and the chapters devoted to munitions remain (in contrast to other chapters of the War Memoirs) a valuable contribution to our historical understanding of a comparatively neglected topic.1 War production was put on a sounder footing and rose dramatically from 1916. Lloyd George and his new ministry, he claims in the War Memoirs, laid the foundation in 1915–16 for the Allies’ material superiority in 1917–18. His account of the work of the Ministry of Munitions in the War Memoirs, however, can be criticised on a number of fronts. His allegations of War Office inefficiency prior to his appointment in June 1915 are, for example, greatly exaggerated, and to a significant extent quantity came at the expense of quality in many areas.


High Explosive Industrial Capacity British Army Munition Programme Western Front 
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© Andrew Suttie 2005

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