Russia: War and Revolution 1914–18

  • Andrew Suttie

Abstract

We come now to a consideration of Lloyd George’s treatment of the eastern theatre of operations. To this point this book has been concerned mostly, in one way or another, with Lloyd George’s account of the war in the west, and the alternatives open to the Western Powers in pursuing the war against Germany and its allies. The conduct, or rather misconduct of the war in France and Belgium certainly preoccupied Lloyd George in the War Memoirs. Lloyd George’s narrative, however, is not confined to that theatre alone. As we have seen, at various points in the War Memoirs Lloyd George discusses developments in the Balkans, the Middle East and Italy, and of course the great opportunities missed by the Western Allies in those regions. There is in the Memoirs also a consideration of various aspects of events on the Eastern Front and in Russia, and it is to aspects of these chapters that I now turn.

Keywords

Europe Explosive Blindness Hate Briton 

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Notes

  1. 5.
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  23. 61.
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  24. 72.
    Cross, Colin (ed.), Life with Lloyd George: The Diary of A.J. Sylvester (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 107. Although Lloyd George was earlier infuriated when he heard that the King was ‘against’ the memoirs. As Sylvester records: ‘He then flared up: “Why should the King be against my book? Was he against Arthur’s book on Kitchener, or against the book on Haig? No, he was not. He raised no objection to what was said about me, yet when I am about to defend myself he does not like it. He can go to Hell. I owe him nothing; he owes his throne to me.”’ Ibid., p. 94.Google Scholar

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© Andrew Suttie 2005

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  • Andrew Suttie

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