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The EU’s Conditionality Strategy: its Development before and after the Fall of Communism

  • Geoffrey Pridham

Abstract

The ‘triumph of democracy’ is a contested term when applied to the changed global environment from the early 1990s, suggesting a somewhat simplistic and arrogant view of events; but in one way it is perhaps applicable. The undoubted growth in democracy promotion (DP) and democratic conditionality (DC) in this recent and current period underlines the priority now accorded to that area. This is evident when looking at the increase in support for democracy through non-governmental organisation (NGO) activity, the greater emphasis on political conditions on the part of a wider range of international organisations and - significantly - the extent to which national governments now give attention to fostering new and fragile democracies and to insisting on democratic requirements in their aid programmes abroad.

Keywords

Political Condition European Economic Community European Parliament Candidate Country North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Geoffrey Pridham 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Geoffrey Pridham
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BristolUK

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